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In 1998 the European Court of Justice - in Grant v. South West Trains Ltd (Case C-
249/96 [1998] I.C.R. 449) - held that the existing EU sex discrimination legislation did 
not extend to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Domestic courts have 
taken the same line with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. However, since 1st December 
2003, discrimination of grounds of sexual orientation has been unlawful in the workplace, 
under the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (‘the Regulations’) 
2003 (S.I. 2003/1661, implemented in response to the Framework Directive, 
2000/78/EC). Unfortunately, these new Regulations, covering employment matters only, 
do not correspond fully with the UK’s existing legislative schemes provided by the Sex 
Discrimination Act, or the Race Relations Act 1976. This is because they do not extend 
to activities such as the provision of goods, facilities and services; housing, and 
education. However, in these activities, there are some cases of sexual orientation 
discrimination that may be argued under the Sex Discrimination Act, the Human Rights 
Act 1998, or the common law. These possibilities will be explored, sometimes with the 
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When the European Court of Justice in Grant v. South West Trains Ltd Case C-249/96 
[1998] I.C.R. 449 held that the existing EU sex discrimination legislation did not extend 
to discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, it rejected the ‘analytical argument’ 
- that men, but not women, are penalised for being attracted to men, and as such, 
treatment on the ground of sexual orientation amounted to treatment on the ground of sex 
(see Pannick, 1985 pp 201-203, Wintemute, 1997 pp 344-348, and Bamforth, 2000, pp 
701-708). The ECJ’s decision echoes the approaches taken in Canada and the US. 
(Respectively: Egan v. Canada (1992) 87 D.L.R. (4th) 320, 330-331); and De Santis v. 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co (1979) 608 F. 2d 327, 331.) More recently, in 
Macdonald v. Secretary of State for Defence [2003] UKHL 34, the House of Lords 
upheld the majority decision of the Court of Session ([2002] I.C.R. 174) that the word 
‘sex’ in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (‘SDA’) did not include sexual orientation, 
reversing the EAT, which held that ‘sex’ should be given broad interpretation because of 
the Human Rights Act. 
 
The good news is that since 1st December 2003, discrimination of grounds of sexual 
orientation has been unlawful in the workplace, under the Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations (‘the Regulations’) 2003 (S.I. 2003/1661, implemented in 
response to the Framework Directive, 2000/78/EC). The bad news is that these new 
Regulations, covering employment matters only, do not correspond fully with the UK’s 
existing legislative scheme provided by the SDA or the (slightly wider) the Race 
Relations Act 1976. This is because they do not extend to activities such as the provision 
of goods, facilities and services; housing, and education. Further, there are no plans to 
  
extend the coverage so. Meanwhile, the Equal Treatment in Goods and Services Directive 
(2004/113/EC, due in force by 21 Dec 2007) has been adopted, which will extend sex 
discrimination law beyond employment matters. The Race Directive (2000/43/EC), 
which was implemented in the UK on 19th July 2003, covers inter alia, education and the 
provision of goods, services, and housing. And recently, the UK government announced 
plans to legislate for religious discrimination in the provision of goods and services.1 So 
whilst dedicated legislation will outlaw discrimination in the provision of goods and 
services on the grounds of sex, gender reassignment, disability, religion or belief, and 
race, it will not do so on the ground of sexual orientation. Until this anomaly is corrected, 
victims will have to use imaginative arguments under alternative causes of action to seek 
a remedy. This article explores the possibilities of such victims suing under the Sex 
Discrimination Act, or the Human Rights Act 1998, or the common law. Some of the 
discussions will draw on Canadian and United States’ experiences. 
 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation may, by coincidence, amount to sex 
discrimination, thus falling within the SDA. The key to success here is making the correct 
comparison and showing that the claimant was treated less favourably than a comparator 
of the opposite sex would have been treated, all other circumstances being the same (or 
‘not materially different’; see SDA, s. 6(3)). So, for instance, one should look for a 
homosexual man being treated less favourably than a homosexual woman. This argument 
succeeded in the Court of Appeal in Smith v. Gardner Merchant [1999] I.C.R. 134, an 
employment case predating the Regulations, which is why it was brought under the SDA. 
Paul Smith was harassed at work. A colleague constantly asked personal questions 
regarding his sexuality and made offensive remarks about him being gay. For example, 
he probably had all sorts of diseases, and that gay people who spread AIDS should be put 
on an island. The Court of Appeal held that this treatment could amount to discrimination 
on the ground of his sex, within the meaning of the SDA. Ward L.J. stated (at [2] and 
[4]): 
 
“[A]s I now see it, the right question had not been addressed. The right question 
… is whether the applicant, a man, had been less favourably treated than his 
employers ... would have treated a woman. By focusing on the applicant's 
homosexuality, the drift of the argument pushes one almost ineluctably - as I 
myself was carried along - to ask the wrong question: was he discriminated 
against because he was a man (sex) or because he was a homosexual (sexual 
orientation)? In concentrating on that, one falls into the error that one does not 
make the comparison which the statute requires namely between his position as a 
man, and the comparative position of a woman. The fault in the argument is that it 
precludes consideration of a vital question, namely whether or not discrimination 
against him based upon his homosexuality may not also be discrimination against 
                                                          
1
 See DTI Press Release,  
(http://www.gnn.gov.uk/environment/detail.asp?ReleaseID=135864&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFromDep
artment=False) and ‘Commission for Human Rights and Equality: Response to Consultation’ 
(http://www.womenandequalityunit.gov.uk/equality/project/consultation_govtresponse_nov2004.doc). 
  
him as a man. I am grateful to Ms Cox [counsel for the claimant] for withstanding 
a fairly hostile judicial barrage and for opening my eyes to errors made by the 
tribunal. ...  
 
To compare like with like, a male homosexual must be compared with a female 
homosexual.” 
 
Smith succeeded on a conservative interpretation of the SDA: a strict man/woman 
comparison. If the facts are disposed to this argument, counsel should have no problem 
persuading a tribunal. The lesson is, for practitioners, when hearing an account from a 
client, is to probe for all the facts and incidents and analyse them carefully, so as not - in 
the words of the contrite Ward, L.J. - to be “carried along” to the wrong question. Other 
examples might include: harassment related specifically to male sexual acts, a gay man’s 
physical strength, competitiveness, or sporting prowess; or adverse commentary 
regarding lesbian mothers. 
 
The limitation of this approach was illustrated by the recent House of Lords decision in 
Pearce v. Governing Body of Mayfield School [2003] UKHL 34. A not unfamiliar story 
was that of the teacher, Shirley Pearce, who was taunted by pupils at her school because 
she was a lesbian. The headmaster told her “grit your teeth.” Later, her head of 
department suggested that she either look for another job or join the supply list. Ms 
Pearce went off sick - for a second time - and, a year later, took early retirement on health 
grounds. She lost her claim against the school for sexual discrimination. Again, although 
this was an employment case, Shirley Pearce had to rely on the SDA, as the facts 
predated the Regulations. The House of Lords held that as the pupils would have 
subjected a male gay teacher to similar abuse, Ms Pearce was not treated less favourably 
than a male gay teacher.2  
 
In the field of education, the obvious problem is homophobic bullying. In an American 
case, Nabozny v. Podlesny, (92 F. 3d 446, (1996) U S CAs 7th Circuit), a group of 
schoolboys subjected Jamie Nabozny, a pupil who was homosexual, to a mock rape. The 
school did not punish the boys, although it admitted it would punish boys who assaulted 
or mock-raped a girl. In fact, the Principal responsible for school discipline told Jamie 
that “Boys will be boys.” This was held to be sex discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Such examples should also amount to sex discrimination under the 
SDA. 
 
For the provision of goods, facilities and services, as well as housing, the same reasoning 
applies. So, for instance, a pub landlord, who refuses to serve gay men, but admits 
lesbians, could be liable under the SDA. Other providers such as swimming baths, gyms 
and sports centres would be equally liable. But note that private clubs are not covered by 
the SDA, (nor the recently adopted Equal Treatment in Goods and Services Directive: Art 
                                                          
2
 A problem with this case is that the House of Lords focussed on the treatment by the pupils, when the 
defendant was the employer. The focus should have been on whether the employer would have treated a 
man, suffering homophobic abuse from pupils, more favourably. On the facts, the result may have been the 
same. 
  
4(5) and Recital 16). The same reasoning applies to the provision of housing, so the 
landlord discriminating between homosexual men and women, would be liable under the 
SDA. 
 
In the medium term, it is likely that the Equal Treatment in Goods and Services Directive 
(2004/113/EC, due in force by 21 Dec 2007), which will extend Community sex 
discrimination law to the provision of goods and services, including housing, but not 
education.3 Although the SDA covers these activities already, some Community Law 
definitions of discrimination will need to be added (see Connolly 2001). The pertinent 
one here is the definition of sexual harassment, which will follow the definition already 
adopted elsewhere: 
  
“- sexual harassment: where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of violating the 
dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”4 
 
The point for the present purpose is that taunting, such as that suffered by Shirley Pearce, 
falls within that definition of ‘conduct of a sexual nature’. Thus the Equal Treatment in 
Goods and Services Directive could extend the protection to homophobic harassment of a 
sexual nature. It will not cover other homophobic harassment, such as adverse 
commentary regarding lesbian mothers. Of course, many cases will be mixture of the 
two. If a claim focuses of the sexual aspects of the harassment, it should succeed.  
 
Another limitation of using the SDA is that it does not give a victim the right to sue for 
discrimination on the ground of another’s sex, (unlike most other discrimination 
legislation, such as the Race Relations Act 1976; Sexual Orientation Regulations; 
Employment Equality (Religion of Belief) Regulations, S.I. 2003/1660; but not the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995.) An example would be where a barman is fired for 
disobeying an order not to serve women.5 Transferred to other activities, this means that a 
man who is refused service in a bar because he has gay male friends (presumably the 
landlord is trying to keep the gay men from patronising his bar), could not sue under the 
SDA because he is being treated less favourably on the ground of somebody else’s sex. It 
should be noted that although there is no individual remedy, the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, by SDA, ss 39 and 40, has power to take action against those who instruct 
or pressurise to discriminate. Further, the Equal Treatment Amendment Directive 
(2002/73/EC, due in force 5 Oct 2005) will categorise instructions to discriminate as a 
form of discrimination, thus providing an individual remedy, and bringing sex 
discrimination law into line. 
 
                                                          
3
 Art 1 provides: ‘4. This Directive shall not apply to education nor to the content of media and advertising, 
in particular advertising and television advertising as defined in Art 1(b) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC.’ 
4
 Art 2, Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC), (inserted by Equal Treatment Amendment Directive, 
(2002/73/EC)), due for implementation by 5 Oct 2005. This Directive covers Employment matters only. 
See also Art 2(d), Equal Treatment in Goods and Services Directive (2004/113/EC). 
5
 Contrast Showboat Entertainment v. Owens [1984] 1 All E.R. 836, EAT, (manager fired for disobeying 
order not to admit black youths) decided under the Race Relations Act 1976. 
  
Human Rights Act 1998 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’) brought the European Convention on Human 
Rights into domestic law, coming into force on 2nd October 2000. Several matters arise 
in cases of sexual orientation discrimination under the HRA. First, whether sexual 
orientation is a ground of discrimination recognised under the Convention. Second, the 
activity must fall within the ambit of a free-standing article of the Convention. Third, the 
horizontal effect problem: Convention rights bind only ‘public authorities’ (as defined in 
the HRA). Forth, discrimination may be justified. 
 
Is Sexual Orientation a Ground of Discrimination Recognised Under 
The Convention? 
Article 14 states: 
 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
 
Although sexual orientation is not included within Article 14’s non-exhaustive list, it was 
held to fall within Article 14 in Salgueiro v. Portugal (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 47. The 
Strasbourg Court said (at [28]): 
 
“The Court is accordingly forced to conclude that there was a difference of 
treatment ... based on the applicant’s sexual orientation, a concept which is 
undoubtedly covered by Article 14 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in that 
connection that the list set out in that provision is illustrative and not exhaustive, 
as is shown by the words ‘any ground such as’ (in French 'notamment’) ....” 
 
The position is similar in Canada. Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms provides:  
 
“15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court has recognised sexual orientation as an “analogous” 
ground of discrimination under section 15.6 In the British case, Godin-Mendoza v. 
Ghaidan the House of Lords took the same approach. ([2004] UKHL 30, per Lord 
Nicholls, at [9], (citing Frette v. France (2003) 2 F.L.R. 9, 23, at [32]); with Lords Steyn 
(at [37]), Rodger (at [103]), Millett (at [55], on this issue only, and Baroness Hale (at 
[136]) concurring. See further below, ‘Section 3 and Statutory Interpretation’) 
                                                          
6
 See eg Egan v. Canada  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609; M v. H [1999] 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577. 
  
 
Ambit - The Activity Must Fall Within a Free-Standing Article of The 
Convention 
The Convention gives no free-standing right against discrimination.7 Article 14 provides 
merely that the rights and freedoms in the Convention must be ‘secured’ without 
discrimination. The most likely rights for the present purpose are: respect for private and 
family life, the home, and correspondence (Art 8); freedom from torture or inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment (Art 3); the right to marry (Art 12), the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Art 1, 1st Protocol) and the right to education 
(Art 2, 1st Protocol).  
 
However, for claims of discrimination there is no need to prove a breach of a substantive 
right. So long as the activity falls within the ‘ambit’ of one of the rights, Article 14 is 
engaged. For example, in Petrovic v. Austria (1998) 33 E.H.R.R. 307, the State paid 
parental leave allowance to mothers, but not fathers. Mr Petrovic, a father, challenged 
this rule under the Convention, for discriminating on the ground of sex. He relied on 
Article 8 in combination with 14. The Court stated that Article 8 did not impose any 
obligation upon states to give financial assistance to parents. However, it went on to hold 
that the allowance fell within the ambit of Article 8 and so Article 14 was engaged. This 
was the Court’s reasoning (at [27]-[29]):  
 
“[T]his allowance paid by the State is intended to promote family life and 
necessarily affects the way in which the latter is organised as, in conjunction with 
parental leave, it enables one of the parents to stay at home to look after the 
children. 
 
The Court has said on many occasions that Article 14 comes into play whenever 
‘the subject-matter of the disadvantage ... constitutes one of the modalities of the 
exercise of a right guaranteed’ (see the National Union of Belgian Police v. 
Belgium judgment of 27 October 1975, Series A no. 19, p. 20, § 45), or the 
measures complained of are ‘linked to the exercise of a right guaranteed’ (see the 
Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden judgment of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 21, 
p. 17, § 39). 
 
By granting parental leave allowance States are able to demonstrate their respect 
for family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention; the allowance 
therefore comes within the scope of that provision. It follows that Article 14 – 
taken together with Article 8 – is applicable.” 
                                                          
7
 The 12th Protocol provides a free-standing right against discrimination. It has been adopted, but not yet 
ratified and the UK government are not likely to ratify it in the foreseeable future. For a discussion of the 
protocol see G. Moon, (2000) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 49; J. Schokkenbroek,  ‘Towards a stronger European 
protection against discrimination: the preparation of a new additional protocol to the ECHR’ and J. Cooper, 
‘Applying equality and non-discrimination rights through the Human Rights Act 1998’ both in Race 
Discrimination, (Oxford: Hart 2000); and V. Khaliq, ‘Protocol 12 to the ECHR: a step forward or a step too 
far?’ [2001] P.L. 457. 
  
 
Although it is clear then that no breach of a free-standing right is necessary to engage 
Article 14, the question remains precisely what the Court meant by the two definitions 
given in the second paragraph. In the Court of Appeal in Mendoza v. Ghaidan [2002] 4 
All E.R. 1162 (aff’d [2004] UKHL 30) Buxton, L.J. cited Grosz, Beatson and Duffy 
(1999, p 327), which concluded that “even the most tenuous link with another provision 
in the Convention will suffice for Article 14 to enter into play”. There have been some 
judicial doubts of this opinion. For instance, in R.(Erskine) v. London Borough of 
Lambeth [2003] EWHC 2479 (Admin), Mitting, J suggested (at [21]-[22]): “[I]t 
overstates the effect of the Strasbourg case law.” And in R. (Douglas) v. North Tyneside 
Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 All E.R. 709, Scott Baker, L.J. commented (at 
[54]):  
 
“For my part I do not read Buxton, L.J. as seeking to extend the ambit of the test 
as set out in Petrovic's case. The bottom line is that the measures of which 
complaint is made have to be linked to the exercise of the right guaranteed.” 
 
The difference between “link” (per Scott Baker, L.J.) and “tenuous link” (per Grosz, 
Beatson and Duffy, 1999 p 327) is perhaps illustrated in Douglas, where it was claimed 
that the refusal of student loans to over-55 year olds amounted to age discrimination, 
under Article 2 of the 1st Protocol (right to education) combined with Article 14. The 
Court of Appeal held that student funding was “one stage removed” (at [57]) from the 
right to education. This is a convenient rubric, with the attraction of apparent certainty, 
but its logic is questionable. In Petrovic the Court stated that parental leave allowance 
showed the state’s “respect for family life”. It is impossible to escape the similarity to 
student loans demonstrating the state’s respect for education. It would seem that 
Strasbourg case law goes further than the interpretation afforded it in Douglas and the 
‘one stage removed’ guide is not helpful. For the present, it is better to observe Grosz, 
Beatson and Duffy’s conclusion. Of the most likely rights to arise, the right to education 
(Art 2, 1st Protocol) is the closest equivalent to an activity covered by the SDA. So, 
discrimination by schools, for example, homophobic bullying, or the tolerance of it, will 
be covered. The rights provided by Articles 8 and 3 warrant further consideration. 
Article 8 - Respect for Private and Family Life, Home, and Correspondence 
 
Cases of sexual orientation discrimination will commonly engage Article 8, which 
provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence”. The element of “family life” has been engaged in discrimination 
cases. For instance, in Salgueiro v. Portugal (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 47 a divorced father was 
refused custody of his daughter because he was homosexual. The Court held that Articles 
8 and 14 were engaged, and found in favour of the father. The element of ‘home’ has also 
arisen in discrimination cases. For instance, in Karner v. Austria, (App. no. 40016/98; 
(2003) 2 F.L.R. 623) the Court recognised that legislation restricting succession rights to 
heterosexual couples fell within Article 8, combined with Article 14. 
 
The element of ‘private life’ is slightly more complicated. In PG & JH v. UK (App. no. 
  
44787/98, ECHR 2001-IX) the Court noted (at [56]): 
 
“Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court 
has already held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual 
orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected 
by Article 8 ...”8 
 
This means that unjustified interference with a person’s sexual orientation and sexual life 
will breach Article 8 per se, with no need to rely on Article 14. For instance, in Dudgeon 
v. UK (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 legislation outlawing sexual intercourse between 
consenting males in Northern Ireland was held to breach Article 8, as it was a continuing 
interference with the applicant’s private life, which included his sexual life. (See also 
ADT v. UK (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 33.) However, for the present purpose at least, the Court 
placed a significant limit on the scope of Article 8 in Botta v. Italy (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 
241. In this case no facilities were laid on to enable a person with a disability to gain 
access to a private beach. Although this broke Italian law, the authorities took no action. 
Botta complained that this omission infringed Article 8 in combination with Article 14, as 
discrimination on the ground of disability. The Court stated (at [32] and [34]): 
 
“Private life, in the Court’s view, includes a person’s physical and psychological 
integrity; the guarantee afforded by Art 8 ... is primarily intended to ensure the 
development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in 
his relations with other human beings... 
 
The Court has held that a State has obligations of this type where it has found a 
direct and immediate link between the measure sought by an applicant and the 
latter’s private and/or family life. ...” 
 
Yet the Court held (at [35]) that: 
 
“In the instant case, however, the right asserted by Botta, namely the right to gain 
access to the beach and the sea at a place distant from his normal place of 
residence during his holidays, concerns interpersonal relations of such broad and 
indeterminate scope that there can be no conceivable direct link between the 
measures the State was urged to take in order to make good the omissions of the 
private bathing establishments and the applicant’s private life.” 
 
The matter was put more clearly in the Commission’s Opinion, which stated (at [35]):  
 
“The rights invoked by the applicant are in fact of a social nature, namely 
participation by disabled persons in recreational and leisure activities associated 
with beaches, the scope of which exceeds the concept of legal obligation inherent 
in the idea of ‘respect’ for private life contained in ... Article 8.” 
                                                          
8
 Citing B v. France 25 March 1992, Series A no. 232-C, at [63]; Burghartz v. Switzerland judgment of 22 
February 1994, Series A no. 280-B, at [24]; Dudgeon v. UK  22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, at [41], 
Laskey, Jaggard & Brown v. UK 19 February 1997, Reports 1997-1, at [36]. 
  
 
For the present purpose, this means, at last in the private sector, that typical cases arising, 
such as the refusal of admission to bars, restaurants, swimming pools and other leisure 
amenities, will not fall within Article 8 of the Convention. The thrust of the Court’s, and 
the Commission’s, Opinions is that the provision of leisure facilities falls outside the 
scope of Article 8. This suggests that the Court would adopt the same view where the 
facility was provided by the State. 
 
In the field of housing, Article 8 only provides a right to respect for a person’s home, not 
a right to obtain one (X v. Germany (1956) 1 YB 202). So, Article 8 covers, for instance, 
discrimination against an existing tenant, but not discrimination against a prospective 
tenant. 
 
Article 3 - Torture, Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
It is conceivable that a case of discrimination could fall under Article 3, which provides 
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to degrading treatment or punishment”. In 
Smith and Grady v. UK (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 the applicants were homosexual and 
served in the armed forces. When their superiors suspected that they were homosexual, 
each was subjected to interrogation, at times abusive, of the intimate aspects of their 
personal lives, which was humiliating and distressing. Although the Court held that this 
did amount to a breach of Article 3,9 it noted (at [121]-[122]): 
 
“[T]he Court would not exclude that treatment which is grounded upon a 
predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual 
minority of the nature described above could, in principle, fall within the scope of 
Article 3 ...” 
 
Thus, upon more severe facts, Article 3 per se, or in combination with Article 14, could 
be breached in a discrimination case. Perhaps the most obvious example here would be 
institutional severe homophobic bullying, or ‘punishment’ of homosexuals, in a school. 
(See Tyrer v. UK (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 1; Costello-Roberts v. UK (1993) 25 E.H.R.R. 112.)  
 
In conclusion, it would seem that the only activities covered by the SDA where it is 
certain the HRA will apply is housing, education; and where the provision of goods, 
services, and facilities touches ‘family’ or ‘private’ life. But it will cover the more 
general or ‘social’ aspects of the provision of goods, services, and facilities. 
 
The ‘Horizontal Effect’ Problem 
‘Public Authorities’ 
The Convention and the HRA do not impose obligations on private parties (‘horizontal 
effect’), only on the State (‘vertical effect’). However, there is a grey area where private 
disputes may involve Convention rights. Article 1 obliges States to “secure for everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... the Convention”. So, a state 
                                                          
9
  The Court held however, there was a violation of Art 8. 
  
can be liable for a breach arising from a dispute between private parties. In Young, James 
& Webster v. UK (1981) 4 E.H.R.R. 38, the State was held liable for the dismissal of 
workers for refusing to join a closed-shop trade union, in violation of their right to 
freedom of association under Article 11; it did not matter whether the employer was State 
or private. The HRA attempts to confine liability to ‘public authorities’, or anyone 
carrying out public functions. Section 6(1), HRA, provides “[i]t is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.” Section 6(3) 
informs us “[i]n this section ‘public authority’ includes ... (b) any person certain of whose 
functions are functions of a public nature ...”  Finally, section 6(5) states “[i]n relation to 
a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of subsection 3(b) if the 
nature of the act is private”. Thus, the draftsmen envisaged two classes of ‘public 
authority’. First, ‘core’ public authorities, which will be liable for Convention breaches, 
whether the act was public or private. Second, ‘hybrid’ authorities, which may be a 
private party carrying out some public functions; these bodies can be liable for 
Convention breaches, but only when carrying out their public functions. 
 
The HRA does not provide the certainty of a list of public bodies, handing a significant 
interpretive role to the courts. After some uncertainty, the House of Lords, Aston 
Cantlow v. Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546,10 made it clear that when deciding who is a 
public authority under the HRA, the courts should follow Strasbourg jurisprudence. Lord 
Hobhouse explained the approach thus (at [87]): 
 
“Neither parliamentary material nor references to the law of judicial review assist 
on this question. The relevant underlying principles are to be found in human 
rights law not in Community law nor in the administrative law of England and 
Wales.  ... The relevant concept is the opposition of the ‘victim’ and a 
‘governmental body’. The former can make a complaint; the latter can only be the 
object of a complaint. The difference between them is that the latter has a 
governmental character and discharges governmental functions.” 
 
This polarised analysis of ‘victims’ and ‘governmental bodies’ suggests that private 
parties, such as housing landlords and schools, cannot be liable under the HRA. This 
appears to emasculate section 6(3)(b), leaving no scope for a hybrid body to be liable. In 
Poplar Housing Association Ltd v. Donoghue [2001] EWCA 595, [2002] Q.B. 48, at 
[59]-[66], the Court of Appeal stated that normally, private landlords, including housing 
associations, are carrying out private functions, and so are not bound by the HRA, section 
6(3)(b). However, on the facts, the Court found that a private landlord, who took over a 
property occupied by a tenant with a weekly non-secure tenancy granted by her local 
authority (pending a decision on whether she was intentionally homeless), was bound by 
the HRA, because the private landlord’s role was ‘so closely assimilated’ to that of the 
local authority’s. This suggests that a private landlord may be bound by the HRA only 
when carrying out a particular public function on behalf of a local authority. It is 
arguable that the position is slightly different for education. In Costello-Roberts v. UK 
(1993) 25 E.H.R.R. 112 the Strasbourg Court made clear (at [27]) “that the State cannot 
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absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or 
individuals.”11 Further, “in the United Kingdom, independent schools co-exist with a 
system of public education. The fundamental right of everyone to education is a right 
guaranteed equally to pupils in State and independent schools, no distinction being made 
between the two.”12 Although this case centred on Government liability before the 
Strasbourg Court, the implication is that education is governmental in character. Thus, 
private schools are bound by the HRA. At the least, where the State is funding, even 
partly, a school, or a pupil at a school, the school’s role relating to the funding could be 
said to be ‘so closely assimilated’ to the State’s role of providing education, it would be 
bound by the HRA. 
 
Nonetheless, Costello-Roberts provides all victims of discrimination by private schools a 
remedy, albeit only against the Government. This logic does not extend to the provision 
of housing, however. This is because the Convention only provides, by Article 8, the 
right to respect for a person’s home, not a right to obtain one (X v Germany (1956) 1 YB 
202). Thus, it is difficult to apply the reasoning of Costello-Roberts to housing, because 
the State has no Convention obligation to house the public.  
 
Section 3 and Statutory Interpretation 
 
Notwithstanding section 6, HRA, private parties, exercising private functions, may find 
themselves bound by Convention rights. This is because section 3, HRA, provides: “So 
far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read 
and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”. Failing this, 
by section 4, a court must issue a declaration of incompatibility. This makes it possible 
for parties to call upon Convention rights in a private dispute which is governed by 
legislation. A recent example occurred in Godin-Mendoza v. Ghaidan [2004] UKHL 30. 
Godin-Mendoza and Mr Walwyn-Jones lived together in a same-sex relationship in Mr 
Walwyn-Jones' rented flat. When Mr Walwyn-Jones died, Mendoza claimed from the 
landlord a right to succeed the statutory tenancy under the Rent Act 1977, which 
provided, by paragraph 2, Schedule 1: 
 
“(1) The surviving spouse (if any) of the original tenant, if residing in the 
dwelling-house immediately before the death of the original tenant, shall after the 
death be the statutory tenant if and so long as he or she occupies the dwelling-
house as his or her residence. 
(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person who was living with the original 
tenant as his or her wife or husband shall be treated as the spouse of the original 
tenant.” 
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The Court of Appeal held that held that “as his or her wife or husband” in paragraph 2(2) 
should read to mean “as if they were his wife or husband” ([2002] EWCA Civ 1533, at 
[35]). The House of Lords upheld that decision, but significantly, Lord Nicholls reasoned 
([2004] UKHL 30, at [35]): “The precise form of words read in for this purpose is of no 
significance. It is their substantive effect which matters.” This tells us that courts should 
not be fettered by an impossibility of a grammatical solution and that section 3 goes 
further merely than resolving ambiguities in legislation. However, the interpretation 
should “go with the grain of the legislation” (per Lord Rodger, at [121]) and not be 
against a fundamental feature of it or amount to a decision better suited for Parliament, 
for instance, where recognising a male-to-female transsexual as female under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 “would have had exceedingly wide ramifications....” (per 
Lord Nicholls, at [33], citing Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003].) For the present purpose, the 
obvious example would be the infamous section 2A, Local Government Act 1986,13 (now 
repealed) which expressly prevented local authorities from the promotion of 
homosexuality or the teaching of “the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended 
family relationship”. As sexual orientation was a ‘feature’ of this legislation, it would 
have been be extremely difficult for a court to give a Convention-compliant 
interpretation, save if it were being misused to promote homophobia. Instead, a court 
finding that the section offended the Convention, would only have been able to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility, under section 4. 
 
 
The Discriminatory Measure may be ‘Justified’ by the State 
 
Unlike most domestic legislation direct discrimination may be justified, but in Karner v. 
Austria, (App. no. 40016/98; (2003) 2 F.L.R. 623) the Strasbourg Court stated (at [37]): 
 
“The Court reiterates that, for the purposes of Article 14, a difference in treatment 
is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, that is, if it 
does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised 
....Furthermore, very weighty reasons have to be put forward before the Court 
could regard a difference in treatment based exclusively on the ground of sex as 
compatible with the Convention ....Just like differences based on sex, differences 
based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of 
justification.” 
 
So, a discriminatory policy can only be justified with weighty reasons, in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim. In Karner, the applicant lived with Mr W in 
a same-sex relationship in Mr W’s apartment. After Mr W died, (designating Karner as 
his heir), the landlord sought possession relying on the Austrian Rent Act which provided 
rights of succession only for family members. The Austrian Government argued that the 
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provision in the Rent Act was for the protection of ‘the traditional family unit’. The Court 
held that whilst the protection of the family could be a weighty and legitimate reason, it 
had not been shown that the exclusion of same-sex relationships from the benefit of the 
Rent Act was necessary for that aim. This was followed in Godin-Mendoza v. Ghaidan 
[2004] UKHL 30, (see above, ‘Section 3 and Statutory Interpretation.’) 
 
The Common Law and the Human Rights Act 
As seen above, section 6(3), HRA, provides that a public authority must act compatibly 
with Convention rights. It is significant that section 6(3)(a) includes courts and tribunals 
as public authorities. This broadens the scope of section 6, but also creates some 
uncertainty as just how far a court can develop the common law to accord with 
Convention rights. The main debate here is whether the courts merely should develop 
existing common law, or to create new law, to accord with Convention rights. The 
Government and the courts have favoured the more conservative former position. 
 
In his final speech at the Third Reading of the Bill, the Lord Chancellor stated:  
 
“[W]e have not provided for the Convention rights to be directly justiciable 
between private individuals. We have sought to protect the human rights of 
individuals against the abuse of power by the state, broadly defined, rather than to 
protect them against each other.” (HL Deb vol 594 col 1231 (3 Nov. 1998)) 
 
This is best understood beyond the usual horizontal/vertical effect dichotomy, using a 
more subtle analysis, with a further distinction between two types of horizontal effect: 
direct, and indirect. With direct horizontal effect, private parties are bound by convention 
rights and thus can be sued for a violation. With indirect horizontal effect, a private party 
may be bound by a convention right, but only through some indirect mechanism, such as 
a court refusing a remedy which would infringe a Convention right (see Clayton 2000, p 
225). The Lord Chancellor’s statement shows that the Government preferred indirect 
effect, but not direct effect.14 The case law so far suggests the judges will take the same 
line. 
 
The cases implementing the ‘indirect effect’ analysis mainly centre on Article 8, which 
provides the right to privacy. This is because, although there is no precise common law 
equivalent, there is an established common law cause of action - breach of confidence - 
with obvious potential for development into a right to privacy. Persons who have suffered 
an invasion of privacy from a private party, usually a tabloid newspaper, relied on, inter 
alia, the law of confidence, supplemented with an argument that this law should be 
developed to accord with Article 8 (see Phillipson 2003, and A v. B plc [2002] EWCA 
Civ 337, [2003] Q.B. 195, and Campbell v. MGM Ltd, ([2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 
457). In Campbell, Baroness Hale accepted this approach, but cautioned that (at [133]): 
                                                          
14
 Earlier, the Lord Chancellor stated (HL Deb cols 783-785 (24 Nov. 1997)): “[I]t is right as a matter of 
principle for the courts to have the duty of acting compatibly with the convention  not only in cases 
involving other public authorities but also in developing the common law in deciding cases between 
individuals... In my view the courts may not act as legislators and grant new remedies for infringement of 
convention rights unless the common law itself enables them to develop new rights or remedies.” 
  
“[T]he courts will not invent a new cause of action to cover types of activity which were 
not previously covered...”. In support of this, she cited Wainwright v. Home Office 
([2003] UKHL 53), a case predating the HRA, where a mother and disabled son suffered 
a ‘gross invasion’ of their privacy when they were strip-searched before visiting another 
son in prison. The House of Lords refused them a remedy. This illustrates, said Baroness 
Hale, that the common law cannot, “even if it wanted to”, develop a new tort.  
 
This is similar to position in Canada, although it was reached using a different device. 
Section 32(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that the Charter applies to the 
national and provincial governments and legislatures, but not to the courts. However, 
section 52(1), Constitution Act 1982, provides:  
 
“The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
of no force or effect.” 
 
Referring to section 52, McIntyre, J, in the Supreme Court in the Retail, Wholesale and 
Department Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd ([1986] 2 S.C.R. 573), asserted (at 
593): 
 
“Where, however, private party ‘A’ sues private party ‘B’ relying on the common 
law and where no act of government is relied upon to support the action, the 
Charter will not apply. I should make it clear, however, that this is a distinct issue 
from the question whether the judiciary ought to apply and develop the principles 
of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined 
in the Constitution. The answer to this question must be in the affirmative. In this 
sense, then, the Charter is far from irrelevant to private litigants whose disputes 
fall to be decided at common law. But this is different from the proposition that 
one private party owes a constitutional duty to another, which proposition 
underlies the purported assertion of Charter causes of action or Charter defences 
between individuals.”15 
 
Although the judicial comments so far in Britain amount to much the same thing, there 
are reasons why the British courts could go further and adopt a ‘direct’ horizontal 
approach. First, Baroness Hale’s comment (above) in Campbell was obiter. Second, as 
the facts in Wainwright arose before the HRA came into force, all it illustrates is that 
courts would not develop new rights-based torts, before they became obliged to act 
compatibly with the Convention. Unlike the Canadian legislation, Britain’s Human 
Rights Act expressly includes the courts as a public authority. Third, the root of the Lord 
Chancellor’s and the judges’ views is that human rights documents are intended to 
protect the individual from human rights abuses by the State. That this reflects Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is no argument. Although the Convention, as an international document 
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between States, was intended to bind only States (and even here the Strasbourg Court will 
hold a State liable for not protecting an individual’s Convention rights, where a private 
party infringed a right - see Young, James & Webster v. UK (1981) 4 E.H.R.R. 38, above, 
“‘Public Authorities’”), the matter is different now, as the Convention has been 
incorporated into domestic law, which, as the Government spun it, was ‘bringing rights 
home’. If a fundamental human right means anything, it is something to which all citizens 
are entitled, regardless of the identity of the violator. If the law cannot remedy this class 
of violations, then the proposition that human rights are fundamental - and now ‘home’ - 
overstates the position. Further, this also allows a Government to violate rights by proxy. 
For instance, if minded, a government could encourage widespread homophobia by 
private parties under a political crusade on ‘family values’. The most obvious solution is 
for the courts to develop and create common law in accordance with the Convention, as 
and when disputes arise.  
 
On the face of it, the restrictive ‘indirect effect’ approach will create anomalies. Take, for 
example, the provision of housing. Since the 1980s, successive Governments in the UK 
have encouraged the movement of local authority housing management into the private 
sector. Under the ‘indirect effect’ rubric a tenant’s human rights may depend on 
something as capricious as the identity of the landlord: state or private (See comments in 
Poplar Housing Association Ltd v. Donoghue [2001] EWCA 595, [2002] Q.B. 48, at 
[59]-[65].) But if the ‘direct effect’ rubric is followed, a court could impose a duty on a 
landlord, public or private, not to discriminate, contrary to Articles 8 and 14.  
 
However, it may be that there is existing common law suitable for development (by 
indirect effect) in the areas of housing and education. The common law once placed 
duties upon the likes of innkeepers, common carriers, and some monopoly enterprises 
such as ports and harbours, to accept all travellers and others who are ‘in a fit and 
reasonable condition to be received’. A rare (if not only) example of one of these duties 
coinciding with racial discrimination arose in Constantine v. Imperial Hotels [1944] 1 
K.B. 693, KBD. During World War II, a hotel refused to accommodate Constantine, a 
black West Indian cricketer (and later a member of the Race Relations Board), for fear of 
upsetting white American soldiers. The Kings Bench division awarded Constantine 
nominal damages for the breach of the Innkeepers’ duty to receive all travellers.  
 
As things stood before the HRA, these duties could be used against hoteliers, and perhaps 
even a yacht club, where they refuse admission, or membership, on the ground of sexual 
orientation. But under the HRA, the courts could develop these duties to prevent 
discrimination under Article 14 in housing (Article 8) and education (Article 2, 1st 
Protocol), although they could not impose such duties into areas of a “broad and 
indeterminate social nature”, such as the provision some leisure facilities, because the 
Convention itself does not provide for this. (Botta v. Italy (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 241, 
discussed above, ‘Article 8 - Respect for Private and Family Life, Home, and 
Correspondence.’) A similar common law doctrine has been developed in the field of 
employment in many states of the US. Employees may claim damages where an 
employer breaches a ‘clearly manifested public policy’, which includes discrimination 




Under the SDA, the discrimination must be on the ground of sex. Thus arguments 
showing sex discrimination, when the principal reason for the litigation is sexual 
orientation discrimination, may become quite technical, and their success may depend 
upon fortuitous facts. The two main problems using the HRA are its limited horizontal 
effect and the restriction of the non-discrimination principle to the Convention’s free-
standing rights. There are some situations where private parties may be bound to observe 
Convention rights: where a private party exercises a public or ‘governmental’ function; 
where a private dispute involves legislation that appears contrary to Convention rights; 
and where the common law - particularly in this context, the ancient duties to receive all-
comers - may be developed to comply with the Convention. There is some overlap 
between the free-standing Convention Articles and the activities covered by the SDA. 
‘Education’ coincides with the right to education (Article 2, 1st Protocol), and in extreme 
cases freedom from degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3); ‘Housing’ falls easily 
within Article 8; but the provision of goods, services, and facilities is not covered where 
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